XMRig and OPSEC Fail

An attacker logged into the honeypot, dropped XMRig and mimikatz, and then ran XMRig. XMRig installed Netshta to maintain persistence and then started mining Monero. When the attacker dropped mimikatz, they accidentally dropped a list of usernames, passwords and IPs. See below for info on XMRig, intrusion summary, OPSEC fail, and IOCs. XMRig XMRig is…

Ako Ransomware

An attacker logged into the RDP Honeypot and quickly ran Ako Ransomware. The attacker had opened the Defender GUI to disable it–but a bot from the previous day had already disabled it. The attacker then dropped Locker.exe, ran it, and then logged off before the execution had completed. Locker.exe is also known as Ako and…

Tridium Niagara Vulnerabilities

**If you’ve been contacted by me, it is because your device is on the internet and may be vulnerable to the vulnerabilities identified below. Please read through this and contact me if you have questions. Thanks** What is Tridium Niagara? Tridium is the developer of Niagara Framework. The Niagara Framework is a universal software infrastructure…

From Zero to Lateral Movement in 36 Minutes

An attacker logged into the RDP Honeypot a few weeks ago and was able to dump credentials and move laterally in 36 minutes. I’ve been seeing more and more ProcDump and less and less mimikatz lately. The attacker attempted to run a couple executables to maintain persistence but these attempts failed. These attempts failed because…

Defender Quarantines Lsass Dumps

An attacker logs into my RDP Honeypot, launches Advanced Port Scanner, attempts to run a Meterpreter reverse shell; and then, dumps Lsass using ProcDump. The attacker, stumbles along the way and does not accomplish their mission. See the timeline, details, summary and IOCs below. Timeline 2:52 – Logon from 185.156.177[.]131 2:55 – Copied Advanced Port…

Debit vs Credit Cards

During the holidays, I occasionally get asked by family and friends if it’s safer to use debit or credit cards. In my opinion, this is an easy answer but instead of repeating the conversation numerous times, I decided to write a short blog about it. So the first question is, what is the difference between…

Defending Against Emotet

Emotet started making the rounds again a couple months ago. If you work in an enterprise environment you’ve probably seen a sample or two. Here’s an in depth write-up by Brian on Emotet TTPs. Here are a few things you can do to defend against Emotet: Block Macros Block macros from running in Word files…

RDP Honeypotting

I recently stood up a RDP honeypot consisting of a Windows VM with Wazuh and Sysmon. SecurityOnion is setup to monitor traffic to/from the internet for the honeypot. A UTM device is sitting between the honeypot and the internet to block ports, applications and proxy all traffic. I haven’t setup ssl decryption yet but I’m…

MouseJack: From Mouse to Shell – Part 2

This is a continuation of Part 1 which can be found here. New/Fixed Mice Since the last blog post, I’ve done some additional testing and it looks like most of the newer wireless mice are not vulnerable to MouseJack. I tested the best-selling wireless mouse on Amazon (VicTsing MM057), Amazon’s choice (AmazonBasics), and one of…

MouseJack: From Mouse to Shell – Part 1

What is MouseJack? MouseJack is a class of vulnerabilities that affects the vast majority of wireless, non-Bluetooth keyboards and mice. These peripherals are ‘connected’ to a host computer using a radio transceiver, commonly a small USB dongle. Since the connection is wireless, and mouse movements and keystrokes are sent over the air, it is possible…